A theorem-proving system has been programmed for automating mildly complex proofs by structural induction. One can see the formal system as a generalization of number theory: the formal language is typed and the induction rule is valid for all types. Proofs are generated by working backward from the goal. The induction strategy splits into two parts:
Introduction
In general, proving properties of programs requires an inductive argument of one sort or other. Structural induction is used in this theorem proving system for automating mildly complex proofs about recursive functions.
Theorem provers using such a method were written by Brotz [7] for number theory and Boyer and Moore [6] for a theory of lists (see also Moore [ 15, 163) . The latter was applied to proving properties of programs written in a LISP-like language. The present system is an improvement over previous works mainly by its typed language and its more sophisticated use of induction.
After an overview of the formal system and the search strategy, the paper explains how induction variables are selected, which includes generalization, and how induction subgoals are generated. Finally, other strategies are presented, including simplification. A detailed example and technical remarks constitute the appendices. Aubin [l] describes the whole system in detail.
R. Aubin

Formal system
The formal system can be thought of as a generalization of number theory, but with implicit outermost universal quantifiers only.
Every term, that is, every variable and function application, has a type. Types and constructor constants are hierarchically introduced. For example, 
(ni) C-ml = nl]]
They introduce the function constants of implication, conjunction, and equality for terms of type nat. The computer program uses another concrete representation for type and function definitions as can be seen in Appendix 1. The inference rules are those of (1) truth, (2) specialization, (3) definition by k-recursion, (4) modus ponens, (5) substitutivity of equality and (6) induction.
The domain of interpretation is a many-sorted word algebra generated by the empty set. A lexicographic ordering is defined over the domain so that the principle of structural induction holds in it. An interpretation is given for the language which leads to a proof of soundness and weak completeness. In particular, the meaning of a function constant defined by cases is a well-defined k-recursive function.
This primitive system is raised by introducing more connectives (or, not, cond) and by derivir.p5 some inference rules. Terms are put in normal form by means of rules inspired I :.om Ketonen's dialect of Gentzen"s sequent calculus [ll] . A thorough description of the formal system can be found in Aubin [ 1, 2] .
Search strategy
Proving theorems can be seen as a game: the formal system sets the rules besides which we have a strategy of play. This strategy must meet three criteria:
(1) it must follow the rules of the game (a question of soundness), (2) it should be a winning strategy (a question of completeness) and (3) it must use a tolerable amount of resources (a question of efficiency). The search strategy of the present theorem prover works backward, reducing the original goal to subgoals, which are in turn reduced to further subgoals, etc. A solution is found when there are no more subgoals to achieve. A procedure to reduce a goal to subgoals is called a tactic [ 121.
A necessary and sufficient condition of soundness of this strategy is that it never reduces a nonachievable goal to only achievable subgoals. This is fulfilled if the tactics are inverses of valid inference rules, primitive or derived. In particular, the tactic corresponding to the rule of truth reduces the goal true ( ) to no further subgoals. Soundness means that when a solution is found, a proof is indeed found.
A necessary condition of completeness can be seen as the converse of the previous condition: an achievable goal must not be reduced to nonachievable subgoals. This is always fulfilled by tactics corresponding to rules which are actually invertible [l, 2] either in general or in some context. As for tactics not bound to invertible rules, the theorem prover tries to find counter-examples to the subgoals they generate: if it succeeds, the condition is not met and the subgoals, rejected; if it fails, we cannot tell for sure that the condition is satisfied, but we have some ground to believe that it is, and the subgoals are retained. In other words, only refutations are decisive.
Finding sufficient conditions for completeness is the main problem of theorem proving and the remaining sections of this paper will describe my contributions in this direction.
The preceding points lead to considering the uti.lization of resources. A source of efficiency in the present prover is the fact that no backtracking takes place, that is, at each stage, only one way of i-educing a goal is irretrievably taken. So, it is sufficient to keep a simple stack of goals: the original goal is pushed down onto it, each tactic reduces the goal on top, pops up the stack and pushes down the new subgoals onto it. But above this structure, the choice and use of tactics have a greater bearing on efficiency. This prover uses the following tactics in turn, until the goal stack is empty:
(1) simplifkation (inverse of a derived rule of substitutivity of equality and rule of definition by k-recursion), (2) splitting (inverse of a derived rule of conjunction: from t and s, infer t & s), (3) replacement (inverse of a derived rule of substitutivity) and strengthening (inverse of a derived rule of weakening: from t, infer s + t), (4) contraction (inverse of a derived rule of substitutivity), (5) truth (inverse of the rule of truth), (6) generalization (inverse of the specialization rule), induction (inverse of the induction rule), and strengthening.
The search is aborted if the current goal cannot be reduced by any tactic, e.g., the goal false ( ).
Induction variables and generalization
The induction tactic has been divided into two distinct parts:
(1) the selection of a list of variables to induce upon and (2) the generation of the induction subgoals, given these induction variables. This section treats the first aspect. Actually, I submit that selection of induction variables and generalization are intrinsically linked together; so, both will be studied in this section.
At the basis of the method for selecting induction variables is the following observation: proving a term by induction is a finite way of expressing the infinite number of computations in which the term is evaluated to true ( ) for all values of its variables. Using a similar analogy, Boyer and Moore [6] put in evidence the fact that only recursion variables were suitable candidates as induction variables. I will further constrain their fundamental idea by focusing on certain recursion terms of particular importance. (A recursion term is a ttrm which occurs in the argument position of a case variable.)
If we allow ourselves to talk of (symbolic) evaluation regarding the application of k-recursive definitions, we may as well talk of computation rule. A computation rule tells us which subterm of a term to apply the k-recursion definition rule to. Nothing can be gained from a completeness point of view by introducing this notion, but it can lead to improved efficiency.
The call-by-need computation rule is known to be optima1 for recursion equations [18] and can usefuily be applied to our problem. The starting point is quite simple. What do we need to know about a function application in order to be able to apply the k-recursive definition rule to it? We need to know the values of its recursion terms, if it has any. The interesting point is that if we apply the call-by-need line of reasoning to an induction goal which has already been simplified, the process will be stopped by one or more variables marking argument positions which the call-byneed evaluator must have more information about: I submit that these variable occurrences constitute excellent candidates for doing induction upon. I call them primary variable occurrences.
A simple example can helpfully illustrate this. Take the goal:
The infix function constant () denotes the function which appends two lists and is defined thus:
co&, kl) e cons(n, k&l)].
.
We start the chain of reasoning with the function constant = ; both of its arguments are recursion arguments. So, we need to evaluate both of them before trying to apply the definition of =. We iterate the process: to know about (j()k)()l, we must know about j()k, and to know about j()k, we must know about j. But we know nothing about j; so, this primary occurrence of j makes a good induction candidate. On the right of the equality, to evaluate j()(k()l), we must know about j again. So, this variable is undoubtedly the induction variable to choose according to this technique. Note its directedness: k and I are never considered. And indeed, this theorem is proved automatically in one induction on (j).
The efficiency of this approach is put in evidence if we replace j by cons(n, jl) as would be done in the generation of an induction conclusion. Primary variable occurrences are the only ones which, once replaced by structures, allow evaluation to be eventually applicable to the whole goal (try with k and I).
The interesting fact about this approach to induction variable selection is that generalization can be integrated to it in a natural way. Which term occurrences in the goal can we consider as better candidates for induction than the primary variables? The answer is simple: the term occurrences leading to them by the call-by-need evaluation, or in other words, the term occurrences in which the primary variable occurrences appear. I call these primary term occurrences, including the primary variable occurrences
The strong relation between selection of induction variables and generalization is theoretically supported by Prawitz's results [ 171. Here is an example with the same flavour as the previous one (the function constant rev denotes the reverse function on lists);
(rev(i)O~)O~ = ~MXMOO~
We do as before except that for each term occurrence considered by the call-by-need evaluator, we ask the question: can this occurrence (may be together with others) be generalized? Th!is is answered negatively or positively according to whether the prover can or cannot refute the generalized subgoal. In this example, the answers are negative untii we get to rev(j): if we replace both occurences of it by a variable, the new subgoal is still achievable (it is actually the same as in the previous example). The new variable is chosen to be the induction variable.
The advantage of this purposeful generalization is that we can meaningfully generalize only certain occurrences of a term and in particular of a variable. For example, with:
we find that the first and the fourth occurrences of j are primary occurrences. We try to generalize them to a new variable which successfully yields:
This subgoal can be proved in one induction on (k).
Note two points:
(1) a search mechanism for counter-examples is essential to such a generalization method and (2) the approach of Brotz [7] and Boyer and Moore [6] to generalization as separated from induction variable selection leads in this example to the nonachievable subgoal k (}j = j(} k.
Some pragmatic aspects must be taken into account in the implementation of this method. In particular, since searching for counter-examples is time consuming, we limit generalization to the cases which have a better chance of success, i.e., when the term occurrences to generalize appear on both sides of an equality or implication (see [6, 7] ). In addition, the above method mav propose several candidates and the system w uses some tie-breaking rules to elect a unique one.
Here is an additional example of generalization. The original goal is:
The function constant subset is defined by cases on its first argument. No generalization is possible in the goal and induction is done on (k). We obtain an induction subgoal for which the induction hypothesis cannot be used:
The first and third occurrences of kl are primary and can now be generalized to yield the subgoal: subset( k2, kr ) * subset(k2, cons(n*, kl)).
which is easily proved in one induction on (kz).
Induction subgoal generation
We now want to find the induction subgoals, given the list of induction variables. In particular, we need to find heuristically justified instant&ions for the induction hypotheses. We may also wish to discard some hypotheses judged useless; it should be clear that this can cut down the complexity of the subgoals considerably.
In order to generate the induction subgoals, Boyer and Moore [6] use a method which maps the structure of what they call a bomb list into the required terms. The bomb list of a goal contains information about how definitions fail to apply to the goal. In Moore's later version [ 161, the corresponding mechanism is directly based on function definitions.
In my tactic, the heuristic part is separated from the nonheuristic part. On the one hand, all induction subgoals are generated on the basis of type definitions. For each of them, the conclusion and all the hypotheses are considered. Since checking the admissibility of type definitions is straightforward, it is easy to convince oneself of the soundness of this nonheuristic part.
On the other hand, the role of the definitions of the function constants appearing in the induction goal does not go beyond giving information about the rejection, or the acceptance and instantiation of tentative induction hypotheses, i.e., 'about the heuristic part. Now, discarding an induction hypothesis from an inductitiu subgoal is sound (by the weakening rule) and preserves the achievability of the induction subgoal. Moreover, instantiating an induction hypothesis is justified by the induction rule.
Induction conclusions and hypotheses are actually represented as substitutions involving the induction variables. By applying these substitutions to the induction goal and bundling up the resulting terms with + ant.l &, we easily obtain the induction subgoals themselves.
The induction tactic first finds the conclusion substitutions. For each variable, the algorithm generates the structures representing all the values that can be assumed by the variable (the system can do induction from any number of bases.) Then, the conclusion substitutions are constructed by successively binding the induction variables to each of their corresponding structures.
As an example, take the induction goal ack(n, rn) p ' y zero; the induction variables (n, m) are selected. The function ack is defined thus: ack(n, m) : nat e cases n [zero * succ( m ) 1 cases m [zero C-ack(n 1, succ(zero)) 1 succ(ml) + ack(nl, ack(succ(nl), m1))]]* We get as possible substitutions for n, the closed structure zero and the open structure, say, succ(nl); similarly, zero and succ(m 1) are associated with m. This means that there are four conclusion substitutions:
( Next, for each conclusion substitution, we have to find zero or more hypothesis substitutions, according to our lexicographic ordering. Consider any conclusion substitution. We simply have to find the immediate predecessors of the list of structures bound to the induction variables [ 1, 2] .
In our example, we get the following results:
(1) no substitutions, since zero has no proper substructures, (1) to reject a hypothesis substitution if no use can be foreseen for it and (2) to find relevant instances for the free variables. Roughly speaking, the strategy applies hypothesis and conclusion substitutions to the induction goal, simplifies the resulting terms, and then tries to match parts of these terms: a failure counts toward rejection of the hypothesis, while a success both counts toward its retention and provides instances for the free variables.
In the Ackermann's example, we have that:
(1) there is already no hypotheses, (2) the tentative hypothesis is discarded since the definition of ack is not recursive for this case and matching cannot even be attempted, (3) by applying the definition of ack to the conclusion and matching, we find the instance succ(zero) for the free variable sl, (4) there are two recursive calls of ack for this case: we get two matches and retain both hypotheses, letting s2 be ack(succ(n I), m 1).
So, finally, the four following induction subgoals are generated:
(1)
* ack(succ(n *), zero)) > zero, This method is not foolproof: it will sometimes retain hypotheses which are, in fact, useless (as above), and sometimes discard useful hypotheses. But, in general, it errs on the safe side.
Other strategies
Other strategies are not so much directly related to using the induction rule.
Indirect generalization
In the following definition:
cons( n, I) e rev2a( II, cons(n, k ))] the nonrecursion argument k does not stay fixed on the right, but becomes cons(n, k). The interest of such definitions lies in the fact that for the class of problems studied, they are literal translations of iterative programs. Such non-fixed non-recursion arguments are called accumulators (following Moore [ 16] ), since they can be considered as holding current values of computations.
Quite often, accumulators have to be generalized when they are not variables. For example, we should generalize nil in the goal rev2a(k, nil) = rev(k), since it will not match cons(n*, nil) in the simplified conclusion of an induction on (k). However, we do not have an occurrence on both sides of = . How can we massage our goal so as to make nil recur on the right of the equality? Intuitively, if we know that I()r?.il = I, we can rewrite rev(k) as rev(k)()nil. So, the goal becomes rev2a(k, nil) = rev(k)()nil, and nil occurs on both sides. What if we replace it by a new variable? We get rev2a(k, I) = rev(k)()l, which is proved easily by inducing on (k), since I can now be replaced by cons(n 1, I) in the induction hypothesis. Similar generalizations can be found automatically for natural numbers and lists by a method using specialization as a means of achieving generalization.
Replacement and strengthening
These tactics are responsible for using the induction hypotheses and is an adaptation of a method already experimented with by Brotz [7] and especially Boyer and Moore [6] . For those members of the antecedent of a goal which are equalitic;., it tries to replace the right by the left-hand side, or vice versa, in one or more members of the consequent. So, grossly speaking, it reduces s = t * z&/z] to s = t * u[s/z], or vice versa. A strengthening' tactic is used concurrently. In effect, the antecedent members of an implication which are involved in replacement are discarded from the antecedent, i.e., s = t + u[s/z] is reduced to u[s/t]. This is called strengthening since it is the inverse of the weakening rule.
These tactics are well justified and preserve achievability when they involve induction hypotheses, but replacement with equalities nc ; constrained by induction requires a new approach.
Splitting
The prover splits conjunctions, that is, it reduces a goal of the form s & t to the subgoals s and t. This tactic preserves achievability. Brotz [7] and Boyer and Moore 16) use it.
Contraction
This tactic reduces a goal of the form f(sl, . . . , s,) = f(tl, . . . , tn) to Si = ti, where Sj is identical to ti: (1~ i G i -1, i + 1 G i G n) and si differs from tie This is actually applied to any consequent member of a term in normal form. The tactic is justified by the substitutivity of equality; however, it does not preserve achievability. A similar strategy can be found in Brotz [7] but not in Boyer and Moore [6] .
Simplification
This is the most important tactic besides induction. The simplification problem splits into three subproblems;
(1) one of logical equivalence between terms before and after simplication, (2) one of complexity measure for terms and (3) one of selection, i.e. what to replace by what in the terms to be simplified. This last question is perhaps the most interesting.
The method used in this prover is inspired from Vuillemin's call-by-need computation rule [18] . Applied to simplification, the rule says: select the leftmostoutermost subterm which can be simplified (i.e. call-by-name), but take the maximum advantage of shared subterms. Because all terms have the same internal representation, the tactic can deal with variables and function applications indistinguishably; moreover, the program which applies a substitution does not do undue copying So, once a term t has been fully simplified, the resulting term s, whether it is a variable or not, is copied in place of term t, whose boolean field is set to true. Thus any superterm which shared term t now shares its simplified equivalent s.
The second half of the selection question concerns the order in which the various simplification rules are applied on a given term. This prover tries successively
(1) pure simplification rules, (2) k-recursive definitions and (3) normalization rules.
The rules are further ordered within each category according to other criteria. The gain in efficiency due especially to the sharing of structures is very important
Conclusion
The strong points of this theorem proving system are (1) its typed language, (2) its mechanism for selecting induction variables and generalizing, (3) its consistent way of generating induction subgoals and ' (4) its fast simplification algorithm. However, its formal system is still too weak: one would like to relax the restrictions on quantification and on type and function definitions. It is also clear that the pure backward search is too limiting and the discovery of useful lemmas on a reasonably large scale will require more of the user (interactively or not).
Two recent works by Cartwright [9, 10] and Boyer and Moore themselves [S] have also had the goal of improving upon Boyer and Moore [6] . Their formal systems are discussed in Aubin [2] . From a search strategic point of view, these two systems leave more room to use guidance.
Cartwright's prover [9, lo] is completely interactive. This means that most tactics must be explicitly invoked by the user through various commands. Only the simplifier, which is built around user-supplied conditional rewrite rules, is called automatically.
Boyer and Moore [S] also make use of simplification based on user-supplied conditional rewrite rules, made available as previously proved theorems. However, they retain the automatic mode of their earlier version. Their strategy for instantiating induction hypotheses is quite similar to the one explained in this paper.
In summary, both Cartwright [9, lo] and Boyer and Moore [5] coupled more powerful formal systems with more user guidance which led to proving theorems of increased difficulty. However, they did not explore the generalization problem. Type definitions are also used for the semantic domains. States are intended to map names to numbers. Our first-order logic forces us to give a function .which applies an object of type FUNCTION to two numbers. We assume that the variables F and M and N have been declared to be of type FUNCTION and NAT respectively:
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The following semantic functions give the meaning of the syntactic constructs; MSE can be said to be an interpreter. NM is a variable of type NAME; In other words, we get the same store if we compile an expression and execute the resulting program, given a store, as if we interpret the expression with the state of the given store and push the result down onto the stack of the store, leaving its state unchanged.
This statement can be proved automatically by the theorem prover with the help of the lemma: which can be proved automatically on its own.
Appendix 2. Note on implementation and results
The prover is implemented in POP-2. This programming language makes list processing easy and its general record facility allows an easy representation of terms.
The program text adds up to roughly 4500 lines of formatted and commented POP-2 code, or alternatively occupies about 175 blocks on disc. It runs on a DECsystemlO with a KAlO processor and th e compiled version occupies 33K of core on top of the sharable PlK of the POP-2 system. Because of the compact representation of the search space, relatively little extra store is needed in the course of generating proofs, so that most of them can be carried out without exceeding SOK.
The tin:: taken for finding a proof varies from a few seconds to a few hundred seconds. This is essentially dependent on the extent to which counter-examples have to be searched for: it is a rather time-consuming strategy. The proof of the compiling algorithm, which does not involve any generalizations, takes only 25 seconds. This prover could prove most of Brotz's and Boyer and Moore's theorems. The missing ones are due to a less sophisticated system for lemma discovery for Brotz's theorems, and to a less developed way of using hypotheses for Boyer and Moore's. Moreover, some theorems could not be proved because searching for counter-examp!es was too long. On the other hand, the elaborate system of types and the generalization strategy made possible the proofs of many new theorems.
Most of these theorems were proved using only a core of basic lemmas in the subtheory of booleans. However, the proofs of some of the hardest theorems (e.g., the compiler correctness) required that equalities of other subtheories be added to the set of simplication rules before they were attempted.
